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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the difficulties that arise when public institutions lack access to 
vital information necessary for the enforcement of their mandate.  We incorporate 
evidence and examples from governance in the Republic of Armenia to demonstrate the 
gains that would occur with improved access.  We outline the information problems, 
describe the principle impediments to governance that occur, and discuss the tools 
incorporated in other countries to help determine the information.  We conclude with 
policy recommendations that would improve the measuring the informal sector in ways 
that will lead to better governance and efficiency. 
 
 
Key Words: institutional arrangements, shadow economy, law enforcement 
JEL Classification: K42, O17, K21 
                                                 
*We gratefully acknowledge the support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  The 
views expressed in this paper are our own and do not necessarily represent the views of IRIS, BearingPoint, 
or USAID.   
** IRIS Center, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD  20742, U.S.A., 
phone: +374 10 583468, e-mail: mnicholson@netsys.am. 
*** USAID Commercial Law and Economic Regulation Program/BearingPoint Inc., 16 Kond, Yerevan 
375002, Republic of Armenia, phone: +374 10 583462, e-mail: amirzoya@yahoo.com.
1 Introduction 
 
Armenia faces severe constraints on many significant determinants of economic growth.  
Some of these are relatively exogenous factors, such as the natural geography that 
prevents easy market access and the closed border that dampens integration into the 
global economy.  Some, however, are relatively endogenous, such as capital 
accumulation or technological development.  We focus in this paper on institutional 
development, and particularly the impact of information needs. 
 
The role of information dissemination in economic development has generally been 
analyzed for its part in efficient capital markets and macroeconomic policy.  Recent 
developments, however, have shifted the focus to information theory and institutional 
economics.1  The potential impact on governance, particularly relating to institutions, has 
had a major influence on the recent spread of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, which 
over fifty countries (including Armenia) have adopted in the past twenty years, and 
another thirty are drafting such statutes.2   
 
Recent research has suggested that information flows can have a strong impact on 
governance and institutional quality.  Islam (2003) shows that countries providing better 
economic information, in terms of quantity and quality, also score much higher for their 
governance and rule-of-law.  Chan-Lee and Sanghoon (2001) suggest that an 
environment supporting institutions and governance is the leading factor for global 
information dissemination.  Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) argue that information flows 
as supported by FOI laws are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the efficient 
dissemination.  Their analysis shows that the information has to implemented by public 
institutions that have successfully reformed their internal cultures. 
 
Institutional development in Armenia is affected by information flows in two major 
ways.  First, many institutions rely on properly collected economic data as a vital input 
into developing proper policy.  Barriers to access of necessary information remain a 
major impediment to the implementation of the law for many agencies, which can have 
dramatic negative impacts on policymaking and economic development.  These barriers 
often tend to arise from a suspicion of government (which is often justified) or a general 
neglect of obligations under law.  The rampant violations of paper laws requiring 
                                                 
1 See Chan-Lee and Ahn (2001) 
2 See Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) 
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information declarations, from tax and customs to statistical evidence on market 
activities, challenge the development of institutions that rely on such evidence to conduct 
their business. 
 
Second, these flagrant violations have a significant impact on informal, or “shadow”, 
market activities. For multiple reasons, much of the economic activity in Armenia 
continues to remain within the informal economy.  Entrepreneurs tend to operate in the 
shadow sector if the potential benefits outweigh the costs associated with the formal 
sector.  Bagrat Tunyan, in a paper presented at the 2005 AIPRG conference, estimates its 
current value around 40% of GDP, down from 75-90% in the late 90’s.  One principle 
result is that policymakers are limited in their ability to assess accurately the nature of the 
economy.  Tunyan argues that one cause of the shadow economy in Armenia is that 
national statistical services and information-sharing between state bodies was 
underdeveloped in the early stages of transition.3
 
UNCTAD’s 2002 National Human Development Report (NHDR) points out the 
challenges to competition in Armenia due to distortions that arise from information 
problems and the shadow economy.  We highlight these difficulties from the perspective 
of a single state agency, the State Commission for the Protection of Economic 
Competition (SCPEC), which is charged with implementing competition (or “antitrust”) 
laws in Armenia.  The structural change in adopting market-based laws is chastened by 
the need to create effective mechanisms for the enforcement of those laws, particularly 
through strong institutions.   
 
As with most legal reform, many countries have found that adopting competition laws 
may be the easiest step towards an effective policy and the real challenge lay in their 
implementation.4  In this paper, we describe the principle impediments to governance 
that occur due to the information flows and discuss the tools incorporated in other 
practices to help determine the information.  We also discuss the direct impact of the 
informal economy on institutional development, and the concerns of private firms on the 
role of government in overseeing and protecting the rules of a market economy. 
 
                                                 
3 He does point out that these types of activities no longer constitute a major portion of the informal 
economy. 
4 See Nicholson (2004) 
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At present, no government ministry or state agency is responsible for general oversight of 
the informal economy in Armenia.  Recent survey evidence suggests that the business 
community believes that such oversight should be handled by SCPEC.5   We discuss this 
evidence, and outline an argument that the competition agency may be best suited for 
taking on some responsibility for this issue. 
 
We conclude with policy recommendations that would improve the measuring the 
informal sector in ways that will lead to better governance and efficiency. 
 
 
2 SCPEC Background 
 
The Armenian competition agency, SCPEC, is an ideal candidate to analyze the 
difficulties of information dissemination, as it was recently designated the most 
transparent state agency in the country.6  The difficulties that it faces in properly 
developing sufficient data are symptomatic of widespread problems. 
 
Competition policy, known as antitrust in the United States, is a relatively new concept in 
Armenia.  Competition laws have rapidly developed as a means of conducting market-
based policy over the past 10 years, in part reflecting the influences of multilateral legal 
structures in the increasingly interdependent global economy.7  The Law on the 
Protection of Economic Competition (LPEC) was drafted in December 2000, instituting 
at the time the State Commission for the Protection of Economic Competition (SCPEC).  
This law is part of a series of market-based laws, also including Securities, State 
Registration, Licensing, Customs, Bankruptcy, and the institution of the Economic Court, 
all between October 2000 and May 2002.8  SCPEC is charged with the protection and 
promotion of economic competition and the development of businesses in Armenia.  This 
generally includes cases on mergers, abuse of dominance, and cartels.   
 
                                                 
5 The AUA’s Turpanjian Center for Policy Analysis (TCPA) as a subcontractor to USAID’s Commercial 
Law and Economic Regulation Program (CLERP) conducted the survey “Armenian Competition Policy 
Business Survey”.  A full analysis of this survey is available as Nicholson and Mirzoyan (2005). 
6 Freedom of Information Center of Armenia (FOICA) 
7 Many of these laws, such as intellectual property rights, are motivated by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  Competition (along with other “Singapore Issues” such as transparency and procurement 
regulations) are not under the jurisdiction of the WTO, but are increasingly being considered part of a 
“recipe” for market-based success.  Clarke and Evenett (2003, p10) note that at the time of their writing 
many WTO members had not adopted any form of competition laws. 
8 Apricot Plus’s (2003) SME Sector Assessment Update 
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Competition is a serious issue in Armenia, and the competition agency still has great 
strides to make in the implementation of its mandate, based on a recent survey of 
businessmen.  The 2005-06 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) ranks Armenia 110 
out of 117 countries in the effectiveness of its antitrust policy.  The report is based on a 
sample of 107 businessmen.  Armenia also ranked 112 of 117 for the “intensity of local 
competition”, 115 on the “extent of market dominance” (by a few business groups), and 
109 for the “effects of privatization on competition and the environment”.9
 
Table 1 lists the responses to these questions for the nine CIS countries included in the 
GCR’s survey.  The first column under each question is the mean score given in response 
to the questions, the second column is the ranking out of the domain of countries in the 
survey, and the third column is the ranking compared to other CIS countries.  Note that 
every CIS country was ranked in the lower half of the survey in every listed category 
regarding competition, and CIS countries made up the lowest three spots in the effects of 
privatization. 
 
Table 1 CIS Responses on Competition in GCR 
Effectiveness 
of Antitrust 
Policy 
Intensity of 
Local 
Competition 
Extent of 
Market 
Dominance 
Effects of 
Privatization 
 
Country 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Armenia 2.6 110 8 3.4 112 8 2.4 115 8 3.7 109 5
Azerbaijan 2.8 105 7 3.8 101 6 3.2 84 4 3.8 104 3
Georgia 3.2 87 3 4.2 85 4 2.9 95 7 4.6 79 1
Kazakhstan 3.5 73 1 4.4 77 3 3.6 69 1 3.7 107 4
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2.5 113 9 4.2 89 5 2.3 116 9 2.6 117 9
Moldova 3.1 90 5 3.2 116 9 3.0 94 6 4.1 95 2
Russian 
Federation 
3.0 94 6 4.5 73 1 3.0 93 5 3.3 115 7
Tajikistan 3.2 89 4 3.7 105 7 3.3 78 2 3.6 111 6
Ukraine 3.4 75 2 4.5 74 2 3.3 79 3 3.3 116 8
 
Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) show that their transparency index is positively correlated 
with the 2004 GCR competitiveness index.  This suggests that transparency can have a 
positive impact on the competitiveness of local businesses, through lower uncertainty and 
efficient investment.  They also found transparency to be positively associated with 
control of corruption and government effectiveness. 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that Armenia did rank 1 of 117 for one category, “the ease of hiring foreign labor”, 
with Georgia ranked second. 
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Effective competition policy can produce strong impacts on national welfare and 
economic growth, far surpassing the necessary investments. The benefits of competition 
policy on national welfare are shown to be significant, but indirect or complementary.  
Clarke and Evenett (2003) show the potential benefits to government spending simply 
through the prevention of bid-rigging.  They compare the potential savings assuming 
15% or 20% markups from cartelized bids and compare it to the budget of competition 
authorities.  In the seven countries reviewed, the potential savings for the national 
treasury amounts from 3 to 170 times the budget of the competition agency.  
 
Like many newly-created market institutions, SCPEC has faced significant hurdles in 
reaching a critical mass within the general public regarding its mandate and 
competencies.  This particularly affects competition agencies, which generally rely on 
complaints generated by the public in order to conduct their normal activities.  The low 
level of awareness in the Armenian business community remains a principle hurdle for 
SCPEC to carry out its mandate.   
 
The effectiveness of the agency is very sensitive to proper information.  Much of the 
casework requires obtaining microeconomic commercial information, essentially firm 
data.  In its 2004 program of activities, the agency specifically described the “shadow 
economy” as a major issue restricting competition, and commented on the difficulties that 
arise from it, particularly for the results of analyses in goods markets. 
 
The problems with information are common for competition agencies in transition 
economies.  The legacy of central planning and the current widespread “crony 
capitalism” creates a reluctance and potential hostility for information requests.  Kovacic 
(2001) argues that before courts have validated the authority of competition agencies for 
data collection, business managers may resist information requests and sometimes 
threaten violence against public officials.  This is a particularly frustrating problem when 
deciphering the ownership structure and relations between firms, which can have 
dramatic impacts on antitrust violations.10  However, even full access to information can 
prove uninformative, as the presented data may be inaccurate.   
 
                                                 
10 Kovacic is discussing general conditions in transition economies, but the point is particularly apt for 
Armenia. 
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Slay (1996), in an edited volume of competition policy in post-communist countries, sets 
aside an entire section to discuss the preponderance of issues related to data collection.  
He points out that in the CIS countries (and Mongolia), authorities grant nothing more 
than “lip service” to official statistics on concentrations and monopoly.  These data 
problems affect measuring and interpreting concentration levels, as well as market 
definition. Generally, statistical agencies do not include the full impact of import or 
export data, nor do they gather comprehensive sale figures for smaller firms and often fail 
to fully account for appropriate demand and supply elasticities.   
 
Torok (1996) outlines the serious issue of identification of market participants for the 
early stages of the competition agency in Hungary, a country that has successfully 
implemented an effective antitrust regime in a formerly planned economy.  At the time, 
there existed the possibility that subsidiaries of one firm might acquire several 
competitors, and without proper identification of the ownership there is no easy way to 
determine whether such a shift in market structure were to increase or decrease 
concentration in the market.  This phenomenon is referred to as “cross-ownership”.  
Torok concludes that with these problems the transition process for competition policy 
will have an institutional or legal focus.  This is likely to prove true for Armenia until the 
problems of implementation can be overcome. 
 
The 2002 NHDR outlined these problems for the Armenian competition agency.  In 
addition to issues related to the LPEC and methodology at the commission, the collection 
of information and perception by business circles were highlighted as significant 
impediments to implementation of the competition law.  This included both distorted 
information about commodity markets and distortions arising from the shadow market 
due to “the unsatisfactory state of the information field”. 
 
Concentration levels are widely used as a general indicator of market power within a 
particular sector or industry.  Industry concentration is usually used for measuring market 
structure in an industry.  Most competition agencies, including SCPEC, publish 
concentration measures in their annual reports, and incorporate them for policy work.11  
Slay (1996) points out that without appropriate data, the derived concentration figure for 
certain markets may be inaccurate.  This yields improper judgments about the value of 
                                                 
11 The US DOJ-FTC guidelines outline specific roles for the use of concentration indicators (HHI) in 
analyzing merger cases. 
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investigations into particular sectors and calls into question much of the policywork 
based on them.   
 
SCPEC traditionally includes a similar measure, the three-firm concentration ratio (CR-3) 
in its publications.  The CR-3 shows the market share of the three largest firms, which 
gives a proxy for the concentration of a particular product market.  Table 1 replicates the 
table from the 2004 program.  
 
Table 2 Concentration Ratios for Sectors of Armenian Market12
 Number of market participants CR-3 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Petrol X 14 10 X 58.10 58.80 
Diesel fuel X 35 21 X 54.67 69.88 
Vegetable oil X 25 X X 59.17 X 
Animal fat X 24 X X 61.73 X 
Pharmaceutical products 77 72 X 28.83 30.06 X 
Coffee 20 21 X 72.00 57.30 X 
Sugar X 9 12 X 98.00 100.00 
Metal X 114 X x 69.65 X 
Champaign and sparking wine 6 18 X 95.30 89.42 X 
Cognac 17 13 X 95.10 85.80 X 
Beer 5 6 14 99.56 99.70 95.87 
Ethyl spirit X 20 X X 95.15 X 
Vodka X 47 X X 80.41 X 
Wine X 40 X X 45.60 X 
Sodium salt and sulfur  2 2 X X X X 
Cigarette without filter X 6 5 X 97.43 99.92 
Soft drinks 54 X X 88.15 X X 
Mineral water bolting 20 48 X 74.80 66.63 X 
Ice cream 8 10 10 86.30 85.16 80.91 
Tuff X 47 X X 37.77 X 
Granite X 5 X X 79.68 X 
Marble X 2 X X X X 
Basalt X 16 X X 82.59 X 
Cement X 2 X X - - 
Plaster 2 2 X - - X 
Pressed gas X X 21 X X 66.78 
Wheat flour  X 19 24 X 80.70 65.73 
Wheat X 22 X X 63.14 X 
Cigarette with filter X 12 10 X 81.66 87.84 
Passenger traffic X 75 X X 20.70 X 
Tourism X 24 X X 36.60 X 
 
As can be seen, many of these sectors are extremely concentrated amongst the three 
largest firms, including sugar and non-filtered cigarettes which both round up to 100% 
market share in 2002.   
 
                                                 
12 SCPEC 2004 Annual Program of Activities 
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The agency’s report qualifies the actual measure of most product markets due to 
unreported or unregistered market activity.  As we discuss in section four below, the 
challenges to accurate reporting of information can have a fundamental impact on the 
proper determination of effect or harm by a firm under the competition law. 
 
 
3 Institutional Impact 
 
The impact of the informal sector on policymaking in Armenia typically has been 
examined with macroeconomic considerations, such as with tax or customs revenue.13  
Proper statistical measures would also dramatically improve the capabilities of the public 
agencies charged with helping to protect the market-based structures that lead to 
economic efficiency.  The absence of informal market information in official statistics 
affects major economic indicators such as GDP and unemployment, with derogatory 
effects on tax revenues and fiscal policy.  Islam (2003) discusses the range of information 
useful for economic decisions, from price information to the disclosure of government 
processes and laws.  She focuses on how the availability of basic economic data affects 
governance, and how the legal framework governing access to information might 
improve governance.   
 
Focusing on the impact on one particular agency, SCPEC, allows for an intensive 
analysis of the costs of imperfect information, along with practical suggestions for 
effective reforms.  The caseload at SCPEC is heavily dominated by information requests.  
This arises in part to a lack of enforceable powers for a failure to comply, as well as a 
reluctance by firms to pass along proprietary and sensitive material to government 
agencies.  54 of the 116 decisions undertaken at SCPEC in 2005, through October, 
involved data requests or penalties for failures to comply with such requests. 
 
At mature competition agencies, such as the US Federal Trade Commission, considerable 
resources are expended on drafting appropriate requests for information.  However, these 
are always linked to direct cases, and the nature of the information requests leads directly 
to a conclusion (which is usually a settlement with outside parties).  In its early years, 
SCPEC undertakes regular market analyses to ascertain the impacts of concentrated 
markets.  The slow response rates to information requests tend to bog down the 
commission in bureaucracy.   
                                                 
13 See, for example, UNDP (2002). 
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3.1 Impact on Role of SCPEC 
 
The recent survey of businesses in Armenia provides significant insight into some of the 
determinants of the lack of information flows. 14   AUA/TCPA conducted the survey 
during the summer 2005 in order to provide an overview of issues facing the 
implementation of competition law in the country. One recurring theme throughout the 
responses was the depth of mistrust of government officials.   
 
Table 3 provides survey results about various characteristics on business development.  
These results show that Armenian businesses are responsive to domestic market 
conditions, and that characteristics of a free enterprise system (capital, demand, etc.) have 
the most impact on their development.  Two oft-maligned culprits of the “transition” 
period, large firms and corruption, have the most unfavorable impact.  Corruption had the 
highest “unfavorable” ratings, in that 225 total firms said that it had an unfavorable 
impact on their business.  Note, however, that Armenia had a relatively high ranking of 
71 of 117 countries on “the business costs of corruption” in the GCR survey. 
 
Table 3 Characteristics of business development and whether favorable 
 Enormous/Great Some/A little No Impact 
 fav. unf. neith. dk fav. unf. neith. dk fav. unf. neith. dk 
Access to financial capital  226 68 10 1 45 14 8 1 7 11 11 0
Friendships or family relationships 
with people who control resources 
or make decisions 
71 10 8 2 98 12 15 4 34 20 123 5
Strength of market demand  207 41 13 7 75 13 13 3 10 1 18 1
Access to necessary inputs  171 35 10 3 74 13 14 1 19 1 59 2
Access to export markets  46 12 4 2 19 4 6 2 17 4 268 17
Aggressive action by large firms 3 70 0 2 5 47 3 0 50 46 168 8
Access to market information  109 11 4 2 107 18 19 8 23 6 89 6
Access to means of resolving 
commercial disputes  
36 10 2 1 74 14 21 4 46 10 171 13
Access to public utilities, e.g. 
electricity, telecom, transportation  
149 66 7 1 85 28 8 2 17 2 36 1
System of government licensing 
and regulation  
62 35 7 2 80 26 15 6 49 3 107 10
Competition from other domestic 
firms 
82 70 6 3 67 34 8 4 37 10 74 6
Competition from imports  18 23 2 0 14 8 7 2 29 5 272 22
Corruption (bribery, favoritism, 
extortion)  
3 112 1 2 5 63 3 0 48 50 112 3
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See supra note 5. 
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Aggressive action by large firms was the second-highest unfavorable, with 163 (40%) of 
the firms saying it was unfavorable.  Both of these categories had much higher 
unfavorable ratios amongst firms that said the characteristic had an “enormous” or 
“great” impact on their business development.  Note, however, that 272 (68%) of the 
firms said that the aggressive action of large firms had “no impact” on their business 
development. 
 
Access to financial capital plays a large role when compared to other characteristics. 305 
firms, or 76%, replied that it had a “great” or “enormous” impact on whether they 
develop their business, and 278 firms said that this characteristic had a favorable impact.  
Traditional market factors also featured highly in business development, particularly for 
market demand and access to necessary materials. The extent to which basic 
infrastructure impacts business operations in Armenia is shown in the responses about 
access to public utilities, in which 28% of firms expressing an opinion listed it as 
unfavorable.   
 
One of most important factors for development of businesses is access to market 
information, although  the survey responses about access to market information were 
fairly mixed.  126 (31%) of the firms said that such access had “great” or “enormous” 
impact, but 124 (also 31%) of the firms said it had “no” impact.  239 (59%) of the firms 
said that market information had a favorable impact, but 112 (28%) said it was neither 
favorable nor unfavorable. 
   
Other key areas provide insight into existing perceptions about commercial activity in 
Armenia, particularly involving understood roles of oligarchs.  The survey evidence does 
not support the idea that internal connections, or clan relationships, play a significant role 
in Armenian business activity.  Only 91 (23%) of the firms said friendships or family 
relations had a “great” or “enormous” impact on this development, and 182 (45%) of the 
firms said that such relations had no impact at all.  203 (50%) of the firms said that this 
had a favorable impact on their business development.  
 
Access to international markets appears to have little impact on business development in 
Armenia.  306 (76%) of the firms said that access to export markets had no impact on 
their decision to develop their businesses, and 328 (82%) of the firms said that access to 
imports had no impact.  278 (69%) of the firms said export markets were neither 
favorable nor unfavorable, and 281 (70%) said competition from imports was neither 
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favorable nor unfavorable.  In a small, open economy such as Armenia, with relatively 
few natural resources, export markets should provide a significant portion of revenue for 
firms.  The closed border seems to take this advantage away, to the point that firms do 
not even consider international markets to be influential in their business development.  It 
is probably surprising to nobody that the non-tariff barriers for the republic appear to 
have a substantial microeconomic impact.   
 
 
3.2 SCPEC Mandate and the Shadow Market 
 
Some respondents demonstrated a strong version to bringing cases before the competition 
agency, which partly reflects a general disillusionment with public officials.  For 
example, 152 (38%) of respondents said they would “never” take a case to SCPEC, 
which includes 105 (26%) of the firms that responded they are “not familiar” with 
SCPEC.  That is, over a quarter of the firms are certain they would never take a case 
before the agency even though they are not even familiar with it. 
 
This reluctance to engage the state agency could reflect a misunderstanding of its 
mandate, which we discuss below.  However, it also reflects a deep-rooted mistrust in 
government in Armenia.  Only 226 firms, or 56%, expected the government to enforce 
competition laws, and 153 (38%) did not.  There is considerable sentiment by the 
business community of a lack of trust in government, that the laws will not be enforced 
because it is not “profitable” for government, that parliamentary members own the largest 
businesses and thus will not enforce the laws.  Many simply stated that “everything in 
Armenia is corrupt”.  Regardless of knowledge of laws or familiarity with SCPEC, or 
inclination to take a case forward, there clearly exists some enthusiasm and thought given 
to how commercial laws can be implemented in Armenia. 
 
Suggested mechanisms for assisting in the implementation are fairly interesting and, at 
times, quite imaginative.  Four firms listed “revolution” as a means of improving 
implementation of the competition law, one citing specifically a revolution to eliminate 
democracy.  One respondent suggested oversight by the Ministry of Interior, Security, 
and Defense.  Four firms listed “democracy”.  Many responses referred to changing the 
“mood” of government, while some referred to development of civil society or market 
mechanisms.   
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The survey provided information that may clarify some of these trends.  Table 4 
replicates a table from the business survey analysis.  It describes responses to questions 
about where firms obtain information about conducting business, according to their 
familiarity with SCPEC and willingness to take a case.   
 
Table 4 Information, Familiarity, and Willingness to Take a Case 
 Where information about conducting business is gathered Willingness 
to take a 
case to 
SCPEC 
 Gov’t 
Agency 
TV Newspapers Radio Internet Biz/Trade 
Association 
Word-of-mouth Noone Other 
Familiar with SCPEC (n=137) 
y 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 7 16 Def. 
n 22 25 26 26 25 25 26 19 10 
y 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 Likely 
n 7 11 11 11 11 11 11 8 7 
y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 50/50 
n 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 10 4 
y 10 0 0 0 2 1 4 8 24 Un- 
likely n 32 42 42 42 40 41 38 34 18 
y 4 1 2 0 2 0 3 13 22 Never 
n 40 43 42 44 42 44 41 31 22 
Unfamiliar with SCPEC (n=265) 
y 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 31 Def. 
n 46 51 51 51 51 51 46 41 20 
y 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 14 Likely 
n 17 18 18 18 17 16 17 17 4 
y 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 16 50/50 
n 21 23 23 24 24 24 24 20 8 
y 10 1 2 0 2 1 7 22 19 Un- 
likely n 51 60 59 61 59 60 54 39 42 
y 16 2 2 2 2 1 9 35 45 Never 
n 89 103 103 103 103 104 96 70 60 
 
Firms familiar with SCPEC but would never take a case are more likely to get their 
information from newspapers, and firms that are unfamiliar with SCPEC but would never 
take a case relatively more likely to obtain their information from business/trade 
associations.15  This suggests that newspapers may be a source of misinformation about 
SCPEC.  It also suggests that business/trade associations may create a stigma against 
state agencies or official involvement, or perhaps that firms with such a bias may tend to 
go to business/trade associations for information. 
 
                                                 
15 The pattern is similar for answers to “economic information”, particularly for the firms familiar with 
SCPEC but would never take a case.  16 of such firms said they get their economic information from 
newspapers. 
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3.3 Barriers to Implementation 
 
Access to information requests from private parties has continually been emphasized in 
reference to successful implementation of the LPEC.16  Reynolds (2005) made numerous 
specific recommendations on how to improve information requests, including stronger 
penalties for non-compliance.  Amendments to the competition law since that report have 
strengthened the penalties, from about USD 200 to USD 1000 for a first violation and 
USD 2000 for a second violation.  Reynolds also suggested that granting SCPEC 
authority for conducting inspections under the Law on Verifications may substantially 
benefit its investigative powers, with necessary amendments to the LPEC in order to 
outline the full breadth of powers.   
 
Abuse of dominance 
 
The challenge to obtaining information is exacerbated by a lack of trustworthiness in the 
data obtained, which often has the same discrepancies as found in data reported to tax 
agencies.  This can have a dramatic impact on the work of the agency.  Consider cases of 
abuse-of-dominance, which include fundamental pillars of competition policy.  The 
statutes of protecting against dominance abuse, particularly as they are applied in the 
United States and the European Union, focus on both creating a level playing field for 
small firms in a market with one large firm or protecting consumers against monopolist 
or near-monopolist firms.   
 
Under the current Armenian competition law, firms are considered dominant if its 
consumption volumes are at least 33⅓ % of the overall market, and they are registered as 
such in SCPEC’s ledger and are subject to monitoring.  Their actions are then considered 
“abuse” if they engage in the types of trade restraints outline in Article 7 of the law, 
which essentially parallels Article 81 of the European law on competition.   
 
The appropriate designation of a firm as “dominant” in Armenia involves two steps.  
First, proper procedure requires an appropriate definition of a product market, and then a 
determination is made whether the firm meets the requisite threshold of one-third 
consumption share.  The latter step basically involves dividing the firm’s volume by the 
full volume of the market.  The very nature of a firm being “dominant in its market” 
                                                 
16 See McArdle (2002) and Nicholson and Melikyan (2005) for examples. 
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involves the market definition.  The most famous misstep in antitrust history occurred at 
the US Supreme Court over an incorrect market definition in a dominance case, during a 
1956 decision on US v. DuPont.  In the case, the Court accepted the proposed market 
definition of “flexible wrapping materials”, in which DuPont did not have a dominant 
position.  However, later commentators have noted that the proper definition of the 
market is for “cellophane”, in which DuPont enjoyed 87.5% market share.  Note that 
authorities made this mistake even with full information at their disposal.  With 
inaccurate or incomplete information, the proper judgment may have been impossible to 
determine.   
 
The threshold criteria currently in use at SCPEC depends, crucially, on having accurate 
statistics about consumption volumes for both the individual firm and the defined market.  
Improper data distorts the measure of market share.  These activities cannot generally be 
calculated due to undeveloped statistical systems or ineffective information-sharing 
between state bodies.  SCPEC generally depends on either the State Tax Service or 
reports from individual firms for its data.  Unfortunately, this data is often unreliable, and 
thus poses great risks to the proper delineation of dominant position as currently outlined 
in the competition law. 
 
Another threat for defining markets is that the research performed by SCPEC shows that, 
in some sectors, the reported volumes are much smaller than is possible when comparing 
production, import and export data. Consider, for example, the agricultural sector.  The 
agricultural product in Armenia is not taxed, and thus it is impossible to estimate how 
much of agricultural product (milk, meat, etc ) is sold in markets, or what portion of it is 
reprocessed. Many cases are simply suspended at the commission due to lack of proper 
information, including recent cases on flour/wheat and mineral water. 
 
The research in flour/wheat market for 2004 shows that the volume of that market to be 
approximately 136,000 tons. Three companies have large volumes, accounting in total for 
about 72% of the market. According to data produced by the entities, about 141,000 tons 
were produced domestically and 14,000 tons was imported.  However, there exists 
inconsistency between numbers presented by the Tax Inspectorate and similar entities.   
For example, the companies provided data to SCPEC showing 130,000 tons in sales, but 
only 53,000 tons were sold according to the Tax Inspectorate.  The difference is not 
insignificant. 
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In the mineral water market, SCPEC analysis showed that 9,121.8 thousand liters were 
produced during the first six months of 2005 was produced of mineral water, of which 
7,385.7 thousand liters was Jermuk water. There are 25 economic entities registered in 
the market, including two importers. Two major firms from Jermuk dominate the mineral 
water market: “Jermuk Group”, with 38.4% of the market by production, and “Jermuk 
Mother Factory”, with 33.7%.  At a public hearing in which the commission sought to 
recognize both as dominant, were “Jermuk Group” presented new, additional 
information, which decreased their share to 27%.  Due to this discrepancy, the case was 
simply suspended. 
  
Neither of these cases involved any allegations of antitrust violations, but they both 
highlight the difficulties that occur involving data collection at the competition agency. 
 
 
4 The Informal Sector 
 
One particularly interesting result from the TCPA survey showed that the business 
community tends to believe the informal market to be within the mandate of competition 
law, as shown in Table 5.  While this can appropriately be interpreted as a charge for 
further advocacy efforts by SCPEC, it provides a useful insight into how “competition” is 
generally perceived in Armenia.  The greatest challenge to a free and fair market may be 
the actions of firms in the shadow market, which would provide an impetus for the 
expansion of SCPEC’s mandate. 
 
Table 5 Whether covered by law, whether important 
 Covered by competition law Importance of coverage 
 yes no dk Very/somewhat not very dk 
Unregistered activity       151 55 196 354 34 14 
Operation of informal 
sector firms                      
149 61 192 361 29 12 
Regulation of sectors 
in the market                    
126 75 201 323 63 16 
Price fixing by 
competitors                      
125 80 197 307 78 17 
Market 
Foreclosure/Prevention 
of Entry       
118 80 204 305 69 28 
Aggressive conduct by 
very large domestic 
firms 
117 86 199 342 45 15 
Price Regulation              116 86 200 302 88 12 
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Political Influence of 
Large Firms                      
115 78 209 329 47 26 
Mergers/Acquisitions      106 81 215 275 104 23 
Aggressive conduct by 
very large foreign firms   
70 123 209 301 83 18 
 
The trend also holds for responses about the importance of coverage.  More respondents 
said they believe that it is “very” or “somewhat” important for the competition law to 
cover unregistered activity or the operation of informal sector firms than any other 
activities.  Aggressive conduct by very large domestic firms was also perceived to be a 
relatively important activity to be covered. 
 
329 firms believed it important that the political influence of large firms be covered by 
the competition laws, and only 32 firms believed it “not at all” important.  This is 
particularly interesting, given the debate on competition policy and political economy.  It 
is a widespread perception that implementation of the competition law is impacted by the 
role of business influence in the National Assembly.  There appears to be some need for 
political will behind SCPEC, and a change in the relationship of business to government 
for effective implementation of the competition law.   
 
The survey responses about likely targets of enforcement also highlight the relationship 
between business and government, as shown in Table 6.  The most popular expected 
target involved firms lacking good relations with government representatives, with a solid 
majority of respondents believing that it is “very likely”. This suggests that respondents 
do expect targeting by the agency for firms out of favor with public officials.   
 
Table 6 Likelihood of implementation 
 Likelihood of implementation 
 Very 
likely
Somewhat 
likely
Somewhat 
unlikely 
Very 
unlikely
Don’t 
know
Large, foreign owned firms 81 105 74 104 38
Large, domestically owned firms 111 119 65 83 24
Firms wholly or partially owned by 
the government 
76 119 71 94 42
Firms in the Formal Sector 94 93 78 88 49
Firms in the Informal Sector 167 114 39 55 27
Firms lacking good relations with 
government representatives  
227 77 33 37 28
Firms recently privatized 81 97 74 67 83
Firms with monopoly license from 
government 
109 71 61 115 46
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The responses for government licensing was mixed, with 180 respondents saying it was 
likely firms with monopoly licenses would be principal targets, and 176 respondents 
saying it was unlikely.  Firms with a monopoly license, or large, foreign firms, were 
those targeted as “very unlikely”.  This reflects a misperception, however, since the 
highest frequency of cases at SCPEC – and certainly the most publicized – is against 
ArmenTel, which meets both criteria.   
 
Behind firms lacking good relations with government representatives, the largest 
responses were for firms in the Informal Sector.  Given this recurring theme, we 
investigate the possible influence of the informal sector on competitive markets in 
Armenia. 
 
Apricot Plus’s SME report lists three primary market constraints to “unfair competition”, 
including monopolies in distribution networks, intellectual property rights, and black 
market activities.  We suggest that strong consideration be given for oversight of these 
activities to be added to SCPEC’s mandate.  Although it is not a traditional power of 
competition agencies, the Commission may fill an oversight void left open by ineffective 
state/government agencies. 
 
A large literature exists on informal economies and the subject remains quite 
controversial on such issues as the definition of shadow economy activities, the 
estimation procedures, and the use of their estimates in economic analysis and policy 
aspects.  The informal economy consists of companies that operate partially or wholly 
outside the law by avoiding taxes, ignoring product -quality and -safety regulations, 
infringing copyrights, and sometimes even failing to register as legal entities.17 In this 
way, these companies gain a cost advantage against their law-abiding counterparts. 
Formal companies in turn miss profits and market share and thus lack the means and 
incentives to invest in productivity-enhancing measures such as expanding capacity, 
installing new technologies, and improving the organization. Together, such problems 
handicap the economic-development process. 
 
Tunyan (2005) argues that the shadow sector in Armenia has developed in large part due 
to corruption, which provides incentives for firms to hide their activities.  This is 
                                                 
17See McKinsey (2004) 
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highlighted by the common situation in which public officials own businesses and create 
favorable conditions outside the existing laws, or in which wealth generated by shadow 
activities has helped individuals obtain public offices.   
 
Since firms in the informal sector are, by definition, working outside legal channels, no 
particular agency has direct oversight over their activities.  Agencies such as Tax, 
Customs, Prosecutor’s Office, MFE, Statistical Service, etc., have some responsibility in 
ascertaining information from the informal market in order to conduct their activities.  
Specific oversight, or attempts to limit or eliminate the shadow market, tend to be 
performed by non-governmental organizations.  The 2002 NHDR points out that in an 
economy where the playing field is not level for all economic actors, simply 
strengthening the tax agency to fend off unreported information can be dangerous and 
inefficient.   
 
SCPEC is the state institution primarily charged with the responsibility to keep a level 
playing field, and the business community perceives a role for the competition agency in 
providing oversight over shadow markets.  It is particularly interesting that firms believe 
that SCPEC is responsible for unregistered activity or the informal sector, even more so 
than price-fixing or market foreclosures.    Perhaps businesses naturally relate issues of 
competition to the shadow market; perhaps the firms working outside the tax and registry 
laws are also generally guilty of antitrust violations.18
 
Note that Armenia ranked 102 out of 117 countries for “favoritism in decisions of 
government officials” in the 2005-06 GCR index. Table 7 lists various CIS responses in 
the GCR about the legal/tax/informal sector in their respective countries.  Note that 
Armenia ranked relatively high in questions about the extent of the informal sector, 
irregular tax payments and the business costs of corruption.  This is especially true when 
compared with the relatively low rankings on competitive markets in the country.   
 
Table 7 CIS Responses on Legal/Tax/Informal Sector in GCR 
Country Efficiency of 
Legal 
Framework 
Extent of 
Informal 
Sector 
Irregular Tax 
Payments 
Business 
Costs of 
Corruption 
                                                 
18 Firms generally admitted that they did not know what conduct is covered by the competition law.  An 
average of 192.2 firms answered “Don’t Know” to questions of particular conduct.  This is consistent with 
only 93 firms knowing that Armenia had a competition law.  182 firms listed “don’t know” to each of the 
options, 26 listed “yes” to all the options, and 19 listed “no” to all the options.  175 firms thus gave varied 
responses to the questions.  The responses of those firms carried similar patterns to the full population. 
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Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Armenia 2.7 93 6 4.7 68 3 4.6 67 2 3.9 71 2
Azerbaijan 3.2 71 2 4.5 60 1 4.5 73 4 4.2 60 1
Georgia 2.4 103 8 5.0 78 6 4.2 84 7 3.5 86 4
Kazakhstan 3.2 72 3 4.8 74 5 3.9 87 5 3.5 85 3
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2.3 108 9 6.3 117 9 3.0 109 8 2.4 116 9
Moldova 2.8 86 5 4.7 69 4 5.2 50 1 3.2 99 5
Russian 
Federation 
2.6 95 7 5.5 106 7 4.6 69 3 2.9 109 8
Tajikistan 3.3 67 1 4.7 67 2 2.6 116 9 3.0 107 6
Ukraine 2.9 81 4 5.7 112 8 4.2 84 6 2.9 108 7
 
Based on the results from the GCR, Armenia may be efficient, relative to other CIS 
countries, in its oversight of corruption and the informal sector, although still well below 
the mean for all countries included in the survey.  Note, however, that the question on 
taxes refers specifically to “undocumented extra payments or bribes in connection with 
annual tax payments”, and does not address the issue of asymmetric tax payments that 
lead to unfair competitive advantages. 
 
National income and governance impact both the level of transparency and impact of 
information flows.  Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) show that transparency tends to vary 
systematically with national income.  Countries with more wealth are generally more 
transparent.  However, they also show that substantial improvements in transparency do 
not require a great deal of resources.  Islam (2003) finds that information flows are 
positively correlated with better governance, which implicitly suggests that information 
flows have a close relationship with economic growth.  She finds that information is 
more useful in countries with a tendency towards democractic, rather than autocratic, 
regimes.   
 
 
5 Policy recommendations 
 
We argue that a stronger emphasis on information flows, particularly from unregulated 
economic activity, can significantly improve institutional development in Armenia.  This 
is particularly true for the Armenian competition agency, SCPEC, whose work could 
benefit greatly by incorporating information from the informal economy.   
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Our principle recommendation is that the competition agency in Armenia assumes the 
authority to obtain information on unregistered firm activity.  We also recommend that 
the agency be granted significant oversight over informal markets.  Together, these 
competencies will empower the institution to better enforce its mandate, and also 
challenge the anticompetitive situation that may arise from asymmetric reporting 
requirements. 
 
One way to avoid the impact of the issue of unreported data would be to amend the LPEC 
to eliminate both the requirements of a threshold of market share and the practice of 
maintaining a registry.  This would put the Armenian competition agency more in line 
with international best practices.  Like many competition laws drafted in Central and 
Eastern Europe since 1991, the Armenian LPEC was based on EU law and principles.  
Some of the words directly reflect the prevailing competition law for the European 
Union, Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome. The procedures adopted by SCPEC 
also tend to reflect European approaches to market share threshold. 
 
Brussels, however, like most antitrust jurisdictions, has been moving in the same case-
specific procedures that emphasize the effects of competition violations.  The leading 
method is a determination of significant market power (SMP) rather than “dominance” as 
defined by market share. 
 
The figures given in the competition law of 33⅓ % market share would then be taken as a 
guideline rather than an exact threshold.  Given the amount of noise in the data, 
regardless of bias, a firm could be in a range of, say, 30-35% market share (or more) and 
still be on either side of the threshold.  The calculated market share would be 
supplemented by additional information in order to have a determination of dominance. 
An alternative would be to shift away from an emphasis on market share in determination 
of dominance.   
 
Given that the market threshold currently exists under law, and the potential difficulties 
for being listed in the Registry is fairly high, firms face a risk of being punished 
specifically for abiding by the tax laws.  Consider a sector in which five firms are active, 
and with equal market share, but only three report their data to the tax authorities.  The 
official statistics would thus list the tax-reporting firms at 33 ⅓% each.  All three firms 
would be subject to being labeled “dominant” and included in the Registry.  However, at 
20% actual market share, it is less likely that any firm could muster the necessary 
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Significant Market Power to be subject to sanctions due to antitrust violations.  This is 
illustrated in Figure One.  Clearly, if the competition commission were to adhere strictly 
to official information, it would be in the unenviable position of drafting decisions 
against firms because they are obeying the laws on reporting. 
 
 
 
Reported Data
C
33%
A
34%
B
33%
 
 
 
 
Actual Data
D
20%
C
20%
B
20%
A
20%
E
20%
 
 
.  
A second issue arises when all firms are registered, but they all underreport data.  Figure 
2 illustrates how this could skew the market analysis.  In the first figure, actual data 
suggests that Firm B has a market share of 38% in a total market of $4,000,000.  It is 
possible that all firms underreport in the same fashion, say by 20%, making the actual 
market $5,000,000, but the same market shares prevail.  The second figure shows how 
the reported data then represents an unbiased sampling.  However, if firms underreport at 
different values, then the situation could be the third figure.  Now, Firm B only has a 
market share of 25%, but Firm C has a market share of 35%.   
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This problem could be overcome if the focus were on actions of firms – and consumer 
harm – rather than market share.  However, given the current status of the LPEC and the 
institutional tradition of the Registry, a more practical solution may be to incorporate the 
practice of ascertaining actual market share instead of reported market share; that is, 
SCPEC should develop the habit of determining the size of the informal market in 
necessary sectors for specific cases. 
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There are many tools available for this determination using indirect analysis.  For 
example, in many sectors, firms require a high level of resources (energy, etc.) in 
carrying out production.  SCPEC could make a determination of implied market share 
based on resource use, or other inputs.  Alternatively, the agency could examine 
downstream uses of a product.  If the firm in question sells its product to retailers, in 
competition with unregistered firms in the same product market, then the Commission 
could obtain information from these retailers to derive estimates about the market share 
of the upstream markets.   
 
The legal basis already exists for this activity.  As Reynolds (2005) points out, Article 
28(2) of the LPEC obligates economic entities to provide all necessary documents for 
formal decisions of the Commission.  One potential impact could be a strong response by 
informal firms in the sector to protect their interests.  Presumably, the firms are in the 
shadow market for a reason, and they would lose some advantages if the state agency 
revealed the true market shares.  If these reactions provide to be violations of the LPEC, 
such as foreclosure in the market or unfair practices with regard to the downstream 
retailers, the SCPEC must have authority to hold these firms responsible.  If the agency’s 
mandate is limited to the formal sector, the incentive exists for firms to for remain in the 
informal sector in order to avoid sanctions on anticompetitive practices.  The first step, 
therefore, is to add resources and improve inspection authority. 
 
One possible option would be to create institutional firewalls between SCPEC and 
agencies, such as Tax or Customs, which could use the information against the firms.  
This is certainly not a first-best solution, but it would create less resistance in the market 
for non-reporting firms to avoid the accurate depiction of market share.  It would leave 
the responsibility of tax collection with the tax agencies, but would allow the competition 
agency to make accurate decisions in the realm of competition.  
 
The relationship between political influence and informal activities would presumably 
lead to countervailing forces from the categories in Table 6 above, as the firms in the 
informal sector lacking good relations with the government are perceived to be the 
principle targets of enforcement.   
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7 Conclusion 
 
Like many countries in transition, Armenia faces many challenges in developing 
institutions necessary to support a market economy.  One specific area involves the 
impact of transparency and information dissemination on governance.  This paper shows 
the potential benefits to improving information flows on the state agency charged with 
the implementation of competition policy, SCPEC. 
 
Recent survey evidence from the Global Competition Review shows that Armenia ranks 
fairly strongly relative to the rest of the CIS in terms of handling corruption or the 
informal sector, but struggles in nurturing a competitive economy.  Recent evidence from 
a survey of businesses in Armenia suggests that the private sector does not have a solid 
comprehension of the role of competition policy in the country, nor do they appear to 
understand the means of undertaking cases against antitrust violations. 
 
We provide examples of the challenges facing SCPEC with regard to information flows, 
and make suggestions for improvement of its daily casework.  This includes a shift 
towards international best practices for determining market power and a charge for its 
mandate to include informal market activities.   
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